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Abstract
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In
an experiment with two subject pools sharing the same geographical and cultural origins, we show
that opportunities for peer punishment increase cooperation among students but not in the general
population. In previous studies, punishment magnified the differences across societies in people’s
ability to cooperate. Here, punishment reversed the order: with punishment, students cooperate
more than the general population while they cooperate less without it.
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JEL classification: C72 · C90 · Z13
I Introduction
The issue of external validity of lab experiments has received increasing attention in the last
decades. While the vast majority of experiments are conducted with a fitting sample of col-
lege students, it remains an open question whether the behaviour observed in such studies is
informative about society at large. Here we focus on experiments on social dilemmas to study
other-regarding preferences and civic norms of cooperation. We compare cooperation levels in
two distinct subject pools originating from the same geographical area. One sample was drawn
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from the student population of a large, public University (Student treatment). The other sample
was drawn from the general adult population (Representative treatment) and stratified accord-
ing to gender, age, and employment status. Everyone participated in public good games with
and without opportunities for peer punishment.
There are many contributions in the literature that compare the behavior of students with
other pools of participants with the explicit aim to test the external validity of laboratory ex-
periments.1 The existing evidence seems to suggest that students are less pro-social than other
subject pools. For instance, in a prisoners dilemma, students cooperate less than white collar
workers (Bigoni et al., 2012) or bicycle messengers (Burks et al., 2009). Similarly, students are
less pro-social than rural and urban citizens in a public good game (Ga¨chter and Herrmann,
2011), than rural villagers in the appropriation of common-pool resources (Cardenas, 2005),
and than employees in a dictator game (Carpenter et al., 2005; Dragone et al., 2013). The gap
remains when one compares students and professionals, i.e. self-selected subjects with a high
degree of expertise who ordinarily deal with situations resembling the experimental task. The
evidence includes studies on: voluntary contributions to a public good among elected officials
(Butler and Kousser, 2013) and shrimp fishermen (Carpenter and Seki, 2011); threshold public
goods without refunding among nurses (Bram Cadsby and Maynes, 1998); trust games among
CEO principals (Fehr and List, 2004).2
More in general, the most appropriate pool of participants should depend both on the task
and the goal of the study. For instance, contractors may be a better sample than college stu-
dents for the external validity of auction experiments (Dyer et al., 1989) and villagers may be a
better sample than city dwellers for experiments about the management of a renewable natural
resource (Cardenas, 2005). Contractors and villagers are more appropriate than students in
this case because they are more familiar with the experimental task and their behavior is more
relevant because they are those who actually make the decisions in the field. Both aspects boost
the external validity of the experimental results.3
1The categories studied include business people and managers Alpert (1967); Cooper (2006); Cooper et al.
(1999); Croson and Donohue (2006); Dejong et al. (1988); Fehr and List (2004); prisoners (Block and Gerety,
1995), lay people (Glaser et al., 2005); children (Harbaugh et al., 2001, 2002; Murnighan and Saxon, 1998); finance
industry professionals (Alevy et al., 2007; Sade et al., 2006); and public affair officials (Potters and Van Winden,
2000).
2For a general review of experiments beyond social dilemmas that compare students with subject pools of
professionals see Fre´chette (2009).
3The choice is task specific, as contractors would not be the most appropriate sample for studying the man-
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The goal of the study is also relevant. When studying issues of bounded rationality, for
instance, one may prefer participants with very high or very low cognitive skills, depending on
the initial conjecture to be tested. High-score participants may be preferred when collecting
evidence about the presence of a bound to rationality. Showing that game theorists choose num-
bers in a guessing game away from the Nash equilibrium prediction provides more compelling
evidence about the descriptive inaccuracy of the theory than using a representative sample of
the general population (Camerer, 2003). Conversely, participants with low cognitive skills who
succeed at a task suggest that such task is not too demanding. In short, to enhance the external
validity of experimental results, one should recruit participants with a bias against the initial
conjecture.
Table 1: Studies comparing college students with the general population
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Stratified Same procedures
sample for both samples Country
TWO DISTINCT SAMPLES
This study Y Y(lab) 1 R R Italy
Cappelen et al. (2010) Y Y(lab) 1 R Norway
Bellemare and Kroger (2007) Y N 1 Netherlands
Falk et al. (2012) Y Y(mail) 1 Switzerland
Carpenter et al. (2008) N* N 1 US
Ga¨chter et al. (2003) N* N 1 Russia
Ga¨chter et al. (2004) N* N 1 Russia
Belot et al. (2010) N Y(lab) 1 1 R 1 1 UK
Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002) N N 1 Germany/US/Spain
ONLY ONE SAMPLE
Harrison et al. (2002) Y Interview 1 Denmark
Ermisch et al. (2009) Y Interview 1 Britain
Exadaktylos et al. (2013) N* Interview 1 1 1 Spain
Bellemare et al. (2008) N* Internet 1 1 Netherlands
Bellemare et al. (2011) N* Internet 1 Netherlands
Dohmen et al. (2008) N* Interview 1 Germany
Egas and Riedl (2008) N* Internet R R Netherlands
Notes: We consider a sample to be stratified if it has been selected according to pre-specified categories and target quotas.
N∗ indicates a representative sample that has not been selected ex-ante according to target quotas. In the cells relative to
each task, 1 indicates a one-shot game and R a repeated game.
As we are interested in norms of cooperation and punishment of the society broadly defined,
the most appropriate pool of participants would be a representative sample of the population at
large. One reason is that civic norms of cooperation are likely to be an emergent property of a
agement of a renewable natural resource.
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society. Let’s consider, for instance, a society made up of young and old citizens. Cooperation
and punishment behaviours can develop in different ways because of two driving forces: first,
young and old citizens may follow different group-specific norms; second, the same individuals
may behave differently when facing only people from the same age group or when interacting in
a mixed group. For instance, youngsters may follow one norm when interacting with peers, but
they may behave differently when they interact with elderly people. When deciding whether to
punish or not, a young person may have no hesitations if the target is another young person
(i.e., in-group), but she may refrain from punishing an old person (i.e., out-group). The prop-
agation of group-specific norms in a society can depend both on the relative size of each group
and on the interaction of in- and out-group norms. Hence, the civic norms of a society cannot
be reduced to the sum of the behavior of specific sub-samples.
Economic experiments conducted with a representative sample of the population are rare.
Recruiting such samples is indeed a hard task because of logistic and technical issues. In
addition, payments must be higher to compensate participants’ opportunity costs. Table 1
summarizes experiments comparing students and a sample of the general population.4
We contribute to the current literature by ensuring high methodological standards and
comparability across participant pools. Following Harrison et al. (2002); Bellemare and Kroger
(2007); Falk et al. (2012); Cappelen et al. (2010), we specified ex-ante stratification variables
and quotas. To the best of our knowledge, this study, along with Cappelen et al. (2010), is
the only experiment conducted in a laboratory to compare a student sample with a stratified
sample. We conducted the experiment by following the same procedures for both students
and the general population. Finally, in order to increase comparability across sub-samples, our
study, together with Falk et al. (2012), restricts participation of the student and representative
samples to those subjects resident in a given region.
Two more technical issues emerge when running experiments outside the group of college
students. First, there can be logistical challenges when running multiple rounds. Unlike most
of the previous studies that focused on one-shot experiments, we collected repeated measures
4Papers comparing students and non-students with the aim of controlling for self-selection in the participation
in experiments are beyond the scope of this paper (for a review, see Exadaktylos et al., 2013).
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of cooperation – with and without punishment – to investigate whether differences in contri-
bution norms evolve over time or remain stable. One-shot experiments may capture the initial
other-regarding disposition but not the reaction to others’ choices. The second issue is the sub-
jects’ level of understanding of the rules of interaction. Uneducated participants may struggle
to grasp a situation described in a formal and abstract manner. Instructions that suit well a
college audience may be obscure to ordinary people. Thus, the misunderstanding of instructions
may be then responsible for the behavioural differences across subject pools.
We report three main findings. First, without punishment, in line with previous evidence, we
found that the general population cooperated more than college students. Second, this results
does not survive the introduction of peer punishment. The introduction of the opportunity to
punish increased cooperation among college students but not in the general population. Third,
this result did not stem from lack of punishment as the general population sample punished
more than the student sample. Punishment did not promote cooperation among the general
population because it was frequently directed toward cooperators rather than free riders. Pre-
vious studies have shown that there exist wide variations in punishment norms across societies:
peer punishment opportunities enable some societies to overcome collective action problems,
whereas lead other societies into feuds and revenge that harm cooperation (Ostrom et al., 1992;
Herrmann et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2010). Here we show experimentally that, even within the
same culture, punishment has a beneficial or a detrimental effect on cooperation depending on
the sub-sample of the population involved. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the characteristics of the subject pools, the experimental tasks and proce-
dures; Section III presents the main results on cooperation and punishment; finally Section IV
discusses results and concludes.
II Participants and design
The experiment comprises two treatments –Representative and Student– that vary only accord-
ing to the composition of the participant pool. All participants, regardless of the treatment,
were born within the Emilia-Romagna region (Italy). This information was common knowledge
and could help subjects to form more accurate expectations about norms and the others’ behav-
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ior. This present restriction was explicitly stated during the recruitment process and publicly
announced by the experimenter at the beginning of each session.
The Representative sample was recruited among the general adult population by two pro-
fessional companies, both unaware of the goal of the research. The companies contacted people
by phone –both through telephone directories and private databases and a local recruiter. Re-
cruiters were provided with a script to approach potential participants.5 To be eligible, subjects
had to: (a) be at least 18 years old; (b) be born within the province of Ravenna;6 and (c) be res-
ident within the province of Ravenna. The sample was stratified according to age (18-39, 40-59,
60 or older), sex, and employment status (employed, homemakers or retired, others – including
students and unemployed). The target quotas for each category were defined according to the
composition of the Italian population.7 To favor wider participation, the subjects received a 30
Euros fuel vouchers as show-up fee in addition to the earnings gained through the sessions.
The Student sample was recruited among the students of the University of Bologna. The
University of Bologna has around 90,000 students with campuses in four of the eight provinces
of the region Emilia-Romagna. Only students that were born in Emilia-Romagna were invited
and could take part in the study.8 Invitations were sent to subjects present in the ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004) database of the Bologna Laboratory for Social Sciences (BLESS) at the time of
the experiment.9 This sample comprises a standard participant pool of college students, which
is roughly balanced between Humanities, Science, and Economic and Business majors.10
5For a detailed description of the recruitment process, see Appendix.
6Ravenna is one of the eight provinces of Emilia-Romagna.
7These data were collected as part of a wider research project to investigate social norms across various
locations in Italy (Bigoni et al., 2013), where Ravenna was selected as one of the provinces of interest. For
sample stratification, we referred to the figures of the National Institute of Statistics concerning inhabitants in
January 1st, 2009 (source Istat: http://demo.istat.it/pop2009/index1.html).
8Because of the limited number of students that were born within the province of Ravenna and present in
the ORSEE database, we decided to include among the potential participants subjects that were born in all
the provinces of Emilia-Romagna: all of them shared similar socio-economic characteristics. As pointed out
by Harrison and List (2004), there are at least two factors, which may restrict the generalizability of lab results
obtained with students: (i) there is an endogenous sample selection among students participating in experiments;
(ii) students are not informative about the general population. Since we are mainly interested in (ii), we do not
take any additional precaution to limit endogenous sample selection among students. In the same spirit, we did
not exclude from the database the small proportion of non-students that used to take part in experiments, we
however retain the term ‘Student’ for brevity.
9Since we are mainly interested in assessing to what extent results obtained with a standard participant
pool can be extended to the general public, we opted for a group of participants as similar as possible to the
one commonly involved in standard lab experiments. To this end, we sampled participants from the ORSEE
database rather than from the general college population of the University of Bologna.
10The database includes a small fraction of non-students, most of them were former students living in the area.
We had 18 non-student participants (17 percent). Thanks to a questionnaire we know that 14 are 32 years old
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Table 2 reports the socio-demographic characteristics of the two samples. Whereas gender
composition is similar, age and employment compositions differ widely. In the Student sample
the vast majority of participants is aged between 18-39, while in the Representative sample most
participants belong to the 40-59 category (44.7 percent) and the remaining subjects are equally
distributed across 18-39 and 60 or above. About half of the participants in the Representative
sample are employed and about 13 percent are students. The overwhelming majority of partic-
ipants self-reported in the questionnaire to be at least second generation natives of the region.
Participants share deep rooted geographical origins, which may suggest shared social norms: as
a matter of fact, about 87 (84) percent of the participants in the Representative sample (Student
sample) have one or both parents born in the region.11
Each session included a series of repeated Public Goods Games with and without punishment
(within-subjects design).12 Tasks were presented in a fixed order in all sessions: each subject first
played 8 periods of a PGG-Standard and then 8 periods of a PGG-Punishment. We followed
this order to help the general population to better understand the punishment mechanism,
which could have been more difficult to grasp had it been presented first.13 Before each period,
participants were divided into groups of N = 4 under a strangers-matching protocol. Interaction
was anonymous and there was no possibility to build an individual reputation: a subject could
not verify whether the same participant was in his/her group in the following periods.
In the PGG-Standard, each subject received an endowment of wi = 20 tokens and had to
decide simultaneously how to allocate those tokens between a group account (x) and a private
account (wi-x). Each group comprised N = 4 members and contributions to the group account
could only take four levels, xi = {0, 6, 14, 20}. Individual earnings were determined as follows:
pi1i = w − xi + a
N∑
j=1
xj
or younger and that 9 hold a college degree. About 1/3 of them hold a college degree and are looking for their
first job.
11The figures for the representative sample refers to the province of Ravenna.
12Each session included a total of five parts presented in a fixed order: 1) choice over lotteries; 2) PGG-
Standard; 3) PGG-Punishment; 4) PGG-Standard; 5) PGG-Threshold. Subjects received a feedback on part 1
only at the end of the session. For the comparison of norms of cooperation across subject pools, we focus only
on parts 2 and 3. Instructions for all five parts are in Appendix.
13We did not control for order effect. Previous studies with a similar set-up found no significant evidence of
order effect (see Herrmann et al., 2008 p. 5, SOM).
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Table 2: Socio-demographic characteristics of the two samples
Representative Student
sample sample
Male 51.5% 55.8%
Age
18-39 24.3% 95.2%
40-59 44.7% 4.8%
60 or above 31.1% 0.0%
Employment Status
Employed 47.6% 8.6%
Unemployed 10.7% 7.7%
Students 13.6% 82.7%
Housewife or retired 28.2% 1.0%
Education Level
8th grade or lower 18.5% 1.0%
High school 47.5% 55.8%
College, Master, or Phd 34.0% 43.3%
Rootedness
Elementary school in the region
(county)
86.4% 97.1%
Mother born in the region (county) 69.9% 72.1%
Father born in the region (county) 63.1% 70.2%
Sessions
Dates (dd/mm/yyyy)
02/03/2011 23/02/2011
04/03/2011 24/03/2011
05/03/2011 24/03/2011
01/10/2011 16/06/2012
No. of participants 108 104
Notes: Self-reported answers from a post-experimental computerized question-
naire. Due to a software failure, questionnaire answers for one Representative
session (02/03/2012) were collected via phone a few weeks after the session. Five
participants did not answer the phone; as a result, for the representative sample,
questionnaire data are available for 103 out of 108 subjects.
where the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of the public good was a = 0.5. At the end
of each period, a subject could observe individual contributions and earnings for each group
member. Earnings cumulated from one period to the next.
The PGG-Punishment was identical to the PGG-Standard but for the addition of a second
stage in which subjects had the opportunity to reduce, at a cost, the earnings of the other
group members. After receiving feedbacks on individual contributions, every subject could
assign pi = {0, 1, 2} deduction points to each group member; a deduction point had a cost of
1 token for the punisher and reduced the earnings of the targeted subject by b = 4 tokens.
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Punishment decisions were simultaneous and earnings were computed as follows:
pii = pi
1
i − b
N∑
j 6=i
pij −
N∑
j 6=i
pji
At the end of each period, a subject could observe the deduction points he/she received and
his/her final earnings. The punisher’s identity was not revealed.
In a one-shot interaction, it is a dominant strategy for rational self-interested subjects to
contribute zero in both PGG-Standard and PGG-Punishment, because the marginal per capita
return of the public good is below 1 and above 1/N , and to assign zero deduction points in
PGG-Punishment. Group surplus is instead maximized when everyone contributes their whole
endowment and never punishes.
The study comprised eight experimental sessions, equally divided across treatments for a
total of 212 subjects. Participants in a session ranged between 20 and 32 and the laboratory
hardware and set-up were identical across subject pools and locations. The same experimenter
read the instructions in all sessions. Representative sessions were held in Faenza in a large hotel
conference room in the city centre, where we deployed the mobile Bologna Laboratory for Ex-
periments in Social Sciences (BLESS). Student sessions took place in Bologna at the permanent
BLESS laboratory.14
In an effort to make the task more intuitive, we largely relied on graphical elements.15 To
facilitate elderly people unfamiliar with computers, all choices could be made by simply touch-
ing the screen (see sample screens in Appendix) and there was indeed no need to type or use a
mouse. At the end of the session, subjects filled in a questionnaire. The average Student (Rep-
resentative) session lasted about 90 (120) minutes. Subjects were paid in private at the end of
the session. The experiment paid 1 Euro for every 40 tokens earned. There was no show-up
fee in the Student sessions and a 30 Euros fuel voucher in the Representative sessions, under
14Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a visually separated desk; no form of communication was allowed during
the experiment. A paper copy of the relevant instructions was handed out before each part and read loud by
the experimenter. Before PGG-Standard and PGG-Punishment, subjects had to answer a computerized quiz to
ensure their understanding. Everyone had to answer all questions correctly before proceeding. The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
15In programming our interfaces, we took inspiration from the first wave of experiments con-
ducted at the Internet Laboratory for Experimental Economics, iLEE (for further details see:
http://www.econ.ku.dk/cee/ilee/description/ilee1/).
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the assumption of a lower opportunity cost for students than for the general adult population.
Average per-capita earnings were 19.50 Euros in the Student sessions and 17 Euros (plus the
show-up fee) in the Representative sessions.
III Results
We report five main results; we first consider aggregate behavior (Results 1, 2, 3) and then
present the evolution of contributions and punishment norms over time (Results 4 and 5).
Table 3: Average contributions to the public good
All periods First Period
PGG Representative Student Representative Student
Standard 9.11 6.79 11.04 10.54
Punishment 8.88 12.77 9.07 10.52
Notes: Average individual contributions to the public good, divided by
subject pool and stage game.
In the PGG-Standard, how do observed contribution levels in the student population com-
pare to the ones observed in the representative population?
Result 1 The representative sample cooperates more in the standard Public Goods Game than
the student sample.
Figure 1: Contributions to the public good over time
(a) Standard (b) Punishment
The average cooperation level over the eight periods was 9.1 in the Representative and 6.8
in the Student treatment. Support for Result 1 is provided by Figure 1 and an ordered logit
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regression, where the dependent variable is the contribution level of a subject in a period (Table
4, Model 1).16 The main explanatory (dummy) variable Representative sample has a positive
and highly significant coefficient, hence suggesting that the general public cooperates more
than college students. To account for subjects’ understanding, we also included the dummy
Low understanding that takes into account the number of mistakes in the control questions and
the time used to answer correctly to all questions. The dummy takes value 1 for subjects in the
last decile of the distribution according to either the number of mistakes or the total answering
time. Our results are robust to alternative ways to model understanding: in Model 2 we included
a dummy that takes value 1 for subjects who made 4 or more mistakes in the control questions
and 0 otherwise. While subjects who made more mistakes contribute significantly more in the
PGG-Standard, the difference between student and representative sample remains large and
significant.17
When following a very conservative approach and considering each session as an indepen-
dent observation, the difference in contributions across subject pools in PGG-Standard is not
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney rank-sum, p=0.149, NR = NS = 4, two-sided).
In PGG-Punishment, how do contribution levels observed in a student population compare
to contributions in the general population?
Result 2 With punishment, the representative sample cooperates less than the student sample.
The opportunity of peer punishment enhances cooperation levels in the student sample but not
in the representative sample.
The introduction of peer punishment reverses the treatment order: the general population
contributes less as compared to students. Average cooperation in the PGG-Punishment was
8.9 in the Representative and 12.8 in the Student treatment. Support for Result 2 comes from
Table 4 and Figure 2.
The difference across subject pools in the PGG-Punishment is highly significant according
16We opted for ordered probit regressions to take into account that the dependent variable was not
continuous but could take on only four values. Models were estimated using the Gllamm pacakege
(http://www.gllamm.org/). We also run OLS specifications and Tobit models to account for censoring at 0
and 20. Our results are robust to the use of these different estimation procedures. Results of these additional
estimations are available upon request from the authors.
17In addition, we control for three alternative ways of modelling low understanding: i) subjects in the last
quartile of the distribution according to either the number of mistakes or the total answering time; ii) subjects
without a college degree or higher; iv) subjects who contributed 6 or 14 in the PGG-Threshold. Results are
qualitatively similar under all specifications and are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 2: Average individual contributions in PGG-Standard and PGG-Punishment
to an ordered logit regression on individual contributions (Table 4, Model 4). The negative
coefficient of the explanatory variable Representative sample lends support to the evidence that
students are more cooperative than the general public in the PGG-Punishment. The difference
is also statistically significant according to a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (p=0.021, NR =
NS = 4, two-sided). Moreover, the opportunity of peer punishment enhances cooperation levels
in the student sample but not in the representative sample (Mann-Whitney signed-rank test,
p=0.068, NS−PGG−std = NS−PGG−punish = 4, p=0.465, NR−PGG−std = NR−PGG−punish = 4,
two-sided).18 To illustrate this outcome, we plotted individual average contributions in the two
variants of the PGG by subject (Figure 2). About 82 percent of students contribute on average
more with than without punishment opportunities (vs. 32 percent in the representative sam-
ple). The upward shift in students’ contributions is present for free-riders and contributors alike.
We are going to consider individual decisions over time in order to grasp a better under-
standing of the underpinning dynamics of cooperation. As a matter of fact, our experiment
offers repeated measures of cooperation; this allows us to analyse the initial contribution levels
as well as the dynamics of contribution and punishment over time (Figure 1).
Result 3 Cooperation in the initial period is indistinguishable between representative and stu-
18Per-period profit decreases from PGG-Standard to PGG-Punishment for both subject pools. In the Repre-
sentative treatment the earnings drop was more pronounced; subjects earned, on average, about 9.1 tokens less
in each period. The loss was of only 1.5 tokens among students.
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Table 4: Treatment effect on contributions.
Dep.var.: Contribution
PGG Standard PGG Punishment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Representative Sample 0.842*** 0.676*** -0.117 -1.487*** -1.631*** -0.573
(0.252) (0.261) (0.327) (0.309) (0.326) (0.367)
Low understanding -0.018 -0.019 -0.506 -0.527
(0.337) (0.362) (0.412) (0.421)
4 or more mistakes 0.576** 0.500
(0.284) (0.352)
Period -0.365*** 0.192***
(0.033) (0.032)
Period x Representative 0.237*** -0.211***
(0.044) (0.043)
N.obs. 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696
Notes: Orderd logit regression on individual contribution levels, individual-level random effects. Symbols
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
dent samples both with and without opportunities to punish.
Table 3 and Figure 1 provide support for Result 3. In the PGG-Standard, individual con-
tributions in the first period are not significantly different across subject pools (Mann-Whitney
rank-sum, p=0.614, NR = 108, NS = 104, two-sided). The same conclusion holds for the PGG-
Punishment (p=0.169, NR = 108, NS = 104, two-sided).
19 We also regressed contributions in
the first period over the dummy Representative sample (see Table A-1 in Appendix) and it turns
out that differences across treatments are not statistically significant for both PGG-Standard
(Model 1) and PGG-Punishment (Model 2).
As shown in Figure 1, differences across treatments emerged over time. While in the first
period, the two pools are indistinguishable, in the last period of the PGG-Standard, the rep-
resentative sample shows a cooperation level more than twice as large as the student sample
(7.9 and 3.3, respectively). In particular, cooperation among students unravels rather quickly
while the general population manages to sustain a more stable contribution level. Support for
this finding is provided in Table 4 (Model 3). The negative coefficient for Period reasserts the
presence of a declining trend in the PGG-Standard, while the positive coefficient in the interac-
tion term indicates that the decline in the Representative treatment is less pronounced than in
the Student treatment. The dynamics in the PGG-Punishment were exactly the opposite (see
Model 6); contributions tend to increase over time and the upward trend is more marked in the
Student than in the Representative treatment.
19For first period data, we consider each subject an independent unit of observation.
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What drives these different trends in cooperation across games and subject pools? To answer
this question, in the last part of this section we will focus on individual decisions to contribute
and punish. We first consider whether the reaction to others’ contributions – i.e., conditional
cooperation – is the same across treatments. Are the adjustment dynamics the same in our two
participant pools?
Result 4 In the representative sample, current contributions depend less on observed past con-
tributions than in the student sample.
We consider an indirect measure of conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher
et al., 2008) and test how current contributions adjust to previous contributions made by oth-
ers.20 Here we mostly focus on the PGG-Standard that in our view provides a cleaner test of
conditional cooperation. Indeed in the PGG-Punishment previous contributions are likely to
be connected with punishment and not just with cooperative behavior.21
Table 5 (Models 1 to 3) lends support to Result 4 for the PGG-Standard. In all speci-
fications, the dependent variable is the contribution level at time t for each subject. In the
first two models we consider each sample separately and the regressor of interest is the sum of
other group members’ contributions in period t − 1 (Others’ contributions in t-1 ).22 In PGG-
Standard, Others’ contributions in t − 1 has a positive and highly significant impact on the
student sample but is not significant in the representative sample (Models 1 and 2, respectively
in Table 5). This result is confirmed also in the pooled sample (Model 3).23
Models 4 to 6 in Table 5 replicate the same analysis for the PGG-Punishment. Both pools
tend to adjust to observed contributions. However, the difference in conditional cooperation be-
tween the two samples is less pronounced in the PGG-Punishment than in the PGG-Standard:
the coefficient of interaction Others’ contributions in t-1 x Representative sample is indeed neg-
20Conditional cooperation is commonly defined as the willingness to contribute to the common pool based on
the expectation that others will contribute as well. We consider an indirect measure and assume that a subject’s
belief about future group members’ contributions depends on their past contributions. Our strangers-matching
protocol weakens this relation compared to a partner-matching protocol. Alternatively, one could have used the
strategy method to directly elicit conditional cooperation.
21If high cooperators are more likely to punish than free riders, there should be a correlation between the
punishment received by a subject and others’ contributions in the previous period.
22We also control for time trend and low understanding as in Table 4.
23As a robustness check, we run the same regressions using a GMM system methodology to check for potential
endogeneity of the variable Others’ contributions in t-1. Results are consistent with the present estimates and
are reported in Appendix.
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ative, although not significant (see Model 6).
We now take into account the analysis of punishment behavior. The differential impact of
punishment on the two subject pools may be the result of different amounts of punishment
or different types of punishment. We say punishment is pro-social when the target of the
punishment is a free-rider; conversely, we say punishment is anti-social when the target is a
high contributor. Does the representative pool punish less than the student pool? Or does the
representative pool punish differently from the student pool?
Result 5 The representative sample punishes no less than the student sample but engages more
in anti-social punishment.
Support for Result 5 is presented in Figure 3 and Tables 6 and 7. The extent of punishment
is similar across treatments and, if anything, it is higher in the representative than in the student
sample (7.2 vs. 5.9).24 Hence, the absence of a positive effect of punishment on cooperation
levels in the representative sample must stem from reasons other than lack of punishment. The
data suggest an explanation based on differences in the target of the punishment as well as in
the response to the received punishment.
Punishment on free riders is heavier in the Student than in the Representative treatment
(15.8 vs. 12.1 average points of punishment); while the opposite is true for punishment on full
cooperators (1.9 vs. 3.0). These differences in punishment are statistically significant according
to a logit regression (Table 6). Moreover, there is no element that points to lack of understanding
as a driver of punishment (Table 6); if anything, subjects with a lower level of understanding
tend to engage in more pro-social and less anti-social punishment as compared to subjects that
did best in the control questions. Figure 3 illustrates this pattern. The steeper line indicates
more favorable incentives for cooperation.
Another way to measure punishment preferences is the level of pro-social vs. anti-social
punishment. In line with other studies, pro-social punishment is more frequent than anti-social
punishment but the ratio is very different in the representative and in the student sample (2.5:1
vs. 4.8:1, respectively). Notice that this treatment difference is present from the first period of
interaction, which suggests that revenge is not enough to account for anti-social punishment.
24A Wilcoxon rank-sum test does not reveal any statistically significant difference when taking each session as
an independent observation (p=0.149, NR = NS = 4).
16
Figure 3: Received punishment by contribution level.
Table 6: Received punishment by contribution level.
Dep.var.: Deductions assigned (1=Yes; 0=No)
xi = 0 xi = 6 xi = 14 xi = 20
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Representative Sample -1.234*** -0.364 -0.073 1.324**
(0.454) (0.354) (0.393) (0.517)
Low understanding -0.837 -0.322 0.263 1.825***
(0.586) (0.473) (0.522) (0.648)
N.obs. 1074 1239 1344 1431
Dep.var.: Deductions assigned (1=Yes; 0=No)
xi = 0 xi = 6 xi = 14 xi = 20
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Representative Sample -1.089** -0.404 -0.234 0.991*
(0.473) (0.371) (0.416) (0.545)
4 or more mistakes -0.541 0.160 0.541 1.179**
(0.494) (0.397) (0.452) (0.583)
N.obs. 1074 1239 1344 1431
Notes: Logit regression on assigned punishment, with individual-level random ef-
fects. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
17
Those who deviate from the average group contribution are punished significantly more,
and punishment is more severe for less-than-average contributions (i.e. a negative deviation)
as compared to more-than-average contributions (see Models 1 and 2 in Table 7). Sign and
magnitude of these coefficients are consistent with similar studies using a strangers-matching
protocol (see, Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).25
Table 7: Treatment effect on punishment.
Dep.var.: Representative Students Pooled sample
Deduction points received Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Other’s contributions -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Positive deviation 0.104*** 0.059*** 0.062***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.022)
Negative deviation(abs) 0.209*** 0.356*** 0.341***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018)
Period -0.033 -0.019 -0.027
(0.027) (0.031) (0.020)
Representative Sample 0.469
(0.365)
Others’ contrib. x Representative 0.012
(0.009)
Pos. deviation x Representative 0.041
(0.027)
Neg. deviation x Representative -0.125***
(0.024)
N.obs. 864 832 1696
Notes: Ordered logit regression on deduction points received, individual-level random effects. Nega-
tive deviation is the absolute value of the deviation of a subject’s contribution level with respect to
the average contribution of the others in her group, in the case that the contribution falls short of the
average, and 0 otherwise. Positive deviation take values other than 0 when a subject’s contribution
is larger than the average contribution of the others. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
When pooling all samples, the evidence suggests again that the representative sample sanc-
tions relatively fewer free-riders and relatively more contributors than the student sample (Mod-
els 3 and 4 in Table 7). This pattern could have discouraged cooperation and might explain
the weak impact of punishment within the representative sample. In the representative sample
there is significantly less punishment of defectors than in the student sample (Negative devia-
tion(abs) × Representative).
25Models 1 and 2 report results for Representative and Student treatments, respectively. The variable Negative
deviations (abs) has a positive coefficient and is highly significant in both treatments (see Models 1 and 2) hence
giving support to the idea that the more the contribution falls short of others’ contributions the more severe the
punishment. Quite surprisingly, also the coefficient of the variable Positive deviations is positive and significant.
That implies that punishment increases as the gap between others’ contributions and socially-minded subjects’
contributions widens. The negative and highly significant coefficient for Others’ contributions implies that a
deviation from others’ contributions is punished more severely if the sum of the contributions is small.
18
Besides shifting the target of punishment, the representative sample also responds weakly to
punishment received. The evidence comes from logit regressions on the variations over time in
contributions levels of free riders and full cooperators (Table 8). More specifically, the dependent
variable takes value 1 if the contribution level in period t is different from t − 1, 0 otherwise.
Free riders who receive punishment do not subsequently increase their cooperation level; and
full cooperators who receive punishment do not decrease their cooperation level (Models 1 and
4). These results stand in sharp contrast to the behavior of the student sample, which strongly
reacts to punishment (Models 2 and 5). The treatment differences are significant (see Deduction
received in t-1 × Representative in Models 3 and 6).
A comparison between the behavior of the student sample versus the young subjects in the
representative sample could be of interest. If the behavior in the two groups is similar then
the added value of a representative sample would mostly originate from the variety in socio-
demographic characteristics. If the behavior differs then it becomes empirically relevant also
how the same subject adapts his behavior depending on who the others are. A first exploratory
analysis points toward the former interpretation. Given the limited number of young people
within the representative sample, further studies are in order before making firm claims.
IV Discussion and conclusions
This study compares the cooperative behavior of two samples sharing similar geographical and
cultural origins but differing along important socio-demographic dimensions: college students
and a representative sub-sample of the general adult population. We find that results from
experiments on norms of cooperation and punishment among students cannot be readily gen-
eralized to society at large.
In a social dilemma, we replicate the common finding that students in a simple collective ac-
tion task are on average less cooperative than the general population (Result 1, see for instance,
Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Bellemare et al., 2008; Cappelen et al., 2010; Belot et al., 2010).
Previous studies show that, when facing social dilemmas, some societies benefit from the avail-
ability of opportunities for peer punishment while others do not, and punishment opportunities
magnify the existing differences across societies in their ability to cooperate (Herrmann et al.,
19
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2008). Here we show that, even within the same society, the impact of peer punishment in
promoting cooperation can vary widely depending on the sub-sample of the population consid-
ered. Our results document that punishment can reverse the ordering of sub-groups in a society
in terms of cooperativeness even when both participant pools are from the same geographical
area. In a public goods game, punishment opportunities had a positive effect on cooperation in
the student sub-sample, whereas little or no effect was detected in the general population. As a
consequence, without peer punishment, students contributed less than the general population;
with peer punishment students were more cooperative than the general population (Result 2).
We found two main factors driving this differential effect of peer punishment. One factor lies
in distinct preferences for punishment. There were differences in the way punishment was used
by the two participant pools: for instance, punishment levels were higher in the Representative
than Student treatment. More importantly, in the general population a remarkable amount of
punishment was directed toward cooperators (i.e., anti-social punishment) and this happened
with a higher frequency than in the students pool, starting from period one. Hence, punishment
did not promote cooperation among the general population because it was frequently directed
toward cooperators rather than free-riders. Another factor is the unresponsiveness to punish-
ment by the general population sub-sample. While students, both high and low contributors,
showed significant reactions to the punishment received in the previous period, those reactions
were not significant in the general population. As a consequence, contributions in the student
sub-sample increase with repetition while they remain flat in the general population.
More generally, a main behavioural difference between the sub-samples is the low reactivity of
the general population to the feedback within the experiment. We report no difference between
the students and the general population sub-samples in their first period average contribution to
the public good game, either with punishment or without punishment. The differences emerge
with repeated interactions. In particular, in the baseline public good game we document less
conditionally cooperative behavior among the general population than among students (Result
4). In the public good game with punishment, as already mentioned, we observe a smaller reac-
tion to past punishment within the general population than within students. One implication of
this evidence is to exert caution when generalizing results of experiments consisting of one-shot
social dilemmas because some differences emerge only over time.
21
There could be a variety of reasons for the low reactivity of the general population to exper-
imental feedback. One reason could be the poor understanding of the rules of the experimental
set-up. When venturing beyond college students, participants may lack a clear comprehension
of the situation at hand. In this study, we put extra effort in the experimental design, software
and instructions to facilitate understanding. Moreover, our econometric analysis supports our
main results also after checking for understanding. Another possible explanation is that some
participants may update their beliefs more slowly. Two motivations come to mind. A rational
motivation could be past exposure to many similar experiences. A behavioral motivation is
related to receiving feedback from someone inside or outside one’s own reference group. For
instance, an elderly person may give low weight to the feedback of a young person, because it
is deemed irrelevant.
Both motivations would suggest a slower updating in an experiment among the general
population than among a homogeneous students population. There can be other reasons, such
as higher cognitive costs of adjustment. In conclusion, these results should not be taken as a
sweeping indictment against laboratory experiments with student populations. On the contrary,
they are part of an ongoing effort to identify those research questions that can be usefully
addressed using students and those that instead are best dealt with other types of participants.
While students are well suited for studying a number of issues (i.e., theory testing, learning,
rationality, etc), the use of a representative sample of the general population is, in our view, the
most appropriate choice when investigating the emergence and the maintenance of civic norms
of cooperation and punishment, which is often the result of the interaction between different
social strata. For instance, if we were to classify the Italian society according to the impact of
peer punishment in promoting cooperation, one would draw opposite conclusions depending on
whether the experiment was run with college students or with the general population.
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